weapons system procurement, and possibly determine the success or failure of the next war. The debate, at its core, is about primacy of doctrine. Air doctrine tends to emphasize the wide-ranging flexibility of power delivered from aircraft as the key 1 ingredient in war, while land warfare doctrine usually assumes the ultimate need to exert some degree of control over the ground and tends to see airpower as a useful, and at times even necessary, supporting force in the performance of this ultimate mission. 3 The dilemma for the JFC is how to meld the sometimes divergent philosophies into a coherent joint operation. The philosophical foundations of the disagreement can be understood by comparing in the basic service doctrine of the Army (FM 100-5, Operations) and the Air 
The Army Concept of Deep Battle
The dictionary defines deep ns both a noun and an adjective. 4 In practical military terms, the word deep refers to an area of the battlefield in relation to a friendly surface force. Deep at its shallowest point can be viewed as just outside organic direct fire weapons and ground based sensor range of a surface force. Deep, at its maximum point, is normally defined as the outer boundary of an assigned AO. The term deep, when used as an adjective, describes the primary focus of the weapon effect or action. Deep weapon systems, for instance, are normally focused on targets that cannot be engaged by a ground based direct fire weapon. Deep attacks refer to attacking enemy fore.??, before they are within the range of ground based direct fires. Deep battle is more than a mission or a range of systems; it is an integral part of the Army's framework for combat. The first element of the battlefield framework is the area of operations. Army doctrine defines an AO as: a geographical area assigned to an Army commander by a higher commander --an AO has lateral and rear boundaries which usually define it within a larger joint geographical area. 5 A key facet of the AO is that it be must be appropriate in size and design so that the commander can accomplish his mission and protect his force. The AO represents the physical boundaries of a commander but not the commander's limits.
The second element of the battlefield framework is the concept of battlespace. Although most references to deep battle in Army doctrine presupposes a close fight will occur (the historical norm), the concept that a deep battle that can achieve an objective is now part ofthat doctrine.
The Air Force Concept of Interdiction
Interdiction is defined as a verb which means to destroy, cut off, or damage. 
Joint Doctrine and Deep Battle
The term, deep battle, is not specifically defined in joint doctrine. Within a JFCs Joint Operations Area (JOA) there may be several subordinate AOs each with distinct boundaries and each with different baselines from which to measure deep.
The concept of depth is discussed in joint doctrine as an operational characteristic. 22 Joint doctrine defines simultaneity and depth as bringing force to bear on the opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the enemy's will to resist. 23 The term "entire structure" is a physical description of space (close and rear), level of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) or a combination of both. Joint Pub 3-0 also describes depth as a concept that "seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation." 24 The term "multiple dimensions" refers to types of attacks (air, direct, indirect, lethal, non-lethal, etc.) or by attacking the enemy across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Finally, depth is described in terms of using time and space to shape future conditions and contributing to the protection of the force by disrupting enemy potential before it can be utilized. The use of time refers to attacking an enemy's decision cycle and removing the time required to plan and execute operations. The use of space refers to the physical space within a given AO or available for enemy use.
Joint Doctrine and Interdiction
Interdiction is defined by Joint doctrine as an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface potential before it can be used effectively against friendly
forces. This definition, like the Air Force's, does not indicate a particular service or weapon system that is generally involved. Joint doctrine identifies interdiction capable forces as including: land and sea based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; Special
Operations Forces (SOF); amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-tosurface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; EW systems; antisatellite weapons; anc space-based satellite systems or sensors. 27 Clearly, all contributors to the JFC's operation are potentially interdiction forces.
The interdiction dilemma faced by an enemy commander, as described in Air
Force doctrine, is highlighted in joint doctrine as one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force commander. 28 The JFC may use the various combinations of forces described above in combination with surface maneuver to achieve the desired objectives. The trade-off and the tension between competing doctrines are left for the JFC to sort out given the specific conditions of the theater. Joint doctrine also recognizes that, under certain circumstances, the JFC may choose interdiction as the principal means to achieve the intended objective.
The JFC's Dilemma
In order to coordinate and deconflict joint action, the JFC must determine the • (Referring to the apportionment decision) The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater-wide interdiction effort.
• The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort.
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• JFC's may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading 32 the interdiction effort).
• Within these AOs (referring to those designated by the JFC), land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. 33 The draft version of Joint Pub 3-03 Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, continues the vague authoritative doctrine over interdiction responsibility.
• Numerous subordinate commanders possess resources that can contribute to interdiction. However, since there will rarely be enough of those assets to meet all demands, a single commander can best ensure the unity of effort required to enable optimum use of joint interdiction assets.
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• Components supporting the overall theater interdiction effort, or the joint effort as a whole, may also conduct interdiction operations as part of their specific mission. Finally, broaden the terms used in joint doctrine to be more inclusive and representative of the forces available to the JFC.
The confusion over who has responsibility for operations between the FSCL and the outer limit of the LCC's AO should be eliminated. Theater responsibility for air interdiction should be defined as distinct from the LCC's deep battle, which includes elements of interdiction. The Army and Air Force have no debate over the nature of the close battle and the requirement to maintain unity of command to achieve unity of effort.
The evolution of advanced systems is expanding the requirement to maintain unity of command over a greater battlespace in order to achieve objectives and protect the force. Force are bound together on the joint battlefield. It is up to joint doctrine to provide the discipline necessary to work as a team.
